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Biresselioglu, Mehmet Efe. 2011. European Energy Security: Turkey’s Future Role and Impact.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Brown, Marilyn A., and Benjamin K. Sovacool. 2011. Climate Change and Global Energy
Security: Technology and Policy Options. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Security is an elusive and contested concept. One entity—a person, a community, a country, or a regional grouping—might understand what constitutes its
security in a way that threatens another. For example, one village’s self-regarding
decision to build a dam to create a reliable water supply can threaten the security of downstream communities. Or in strategic affairs, a security dilemma invariably emerges when one country’s arms buildup prompts another’s, which in
turn escalates tensions. In these examples, the predicament is clear, yet so is the
solution. By establishing frameworks for negotiation and crafting institutions,
distrust can be overcome and cooperation nurtured.
But what happens when security is not about reconciling different actors’
competing interests? When it is not about one’s pursuit of what it deems necessary threatening another? What if a perfectly established notion of security in
one domain is completely at odds with what constitutes security in another
domain? A clear example of this problem is traditional approaches to energy security, which is conventionally deªned as a country having enough reliable, affordable energy to ensure steady economic growth. Energy security is often associated with national security logics, as a country depends on energy to power its
economy. In practice, of course, countries do cooperate with one another to obtain sufªcient supplies of energy at a good price. Yet, as readers of this journal
know well, such cooperation has long been heedless of the impact of greenhouse gas emissions, not to mention the greater environmental impact of unconventional fossil fuel resources, such as tar sands, when traditional sources
become scarce. Put bluntly, the pursuit of energy security as conventionally understood leads to climate insecurity.
Global Environmental Politics 13:2, May 2013, doi:10.1162/GLEP_r_00171
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Anceschi, Luca, and Jonathan Symons. 2012. Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change:
The Asia-Paciªc Experience. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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What is striking about climate security, in contrast to such domains as national security, societal security, and—yes—energy security, is that even within a
discourse of securitization it has a more collective or universal ambiance. A stable climate beneªts all human activities, not just one community or country. Yet
if one goes so far as to make a typical securitization move on behalf of climate
security—e.g., specifying climate change as an urgent threat that requires immediate attention—then the concern has dramatic implications.
All three volumes discussed here grapple with the fundamental incommensurability of energy security and climate security. They display a wide range
of methodological approaches, geographical scopes, political persuasions, and
levels of optimism. In terms of J. S. Mill’s method of difference,1 comparing
these books is like comparing an apple, an orange, and a carrot. Still, the authors share a concern with engaging energy security within the context of a
warming climate. Can the existing way of life be sustained even as transformations need to be made? How can innovation and fundamental reform be introduced and nurtured, both short term and long term? What about the demands
of rapidly industrializing regions of the world?
The apple and the orange—the pieces of fruit—are Biresselioglu’s study of
Turkey’s central role in European energy politics, and Anceschi and Symons’ edited collection on Asia and the Paciªc Rim. Both books emerge from Palgrave
Macmillan’s Energy, Climate and the Environment Series (ECES). Despite their
common rubric, the two volumes are different, not least because the latter is a
collection. The carrot—the vegetable—is Brown and Sovacool’s book, which
stands out for its ªrm rejection of conventional deªnitions of energy security, its
pursuit of solutions, and its accessibility.
For his part, Biresselioglu, in European Energy Security, offers a detailed,
thorough analysis of Turkey’s position as an energy transfer state: it plays the
central role in the transfer of hydrocarbons from the East to the EU. In so doing,
it ensures its diplomatic and geostrategic importance. From the theoretical issues associated with energy security, to the EU’s insatiable demand for energy, to
its abundant supply in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, Turkey’s centrality
is undeniable. It is hard to imagine a country in a more strategic position in a
more fraught region, and Biresselioglu does a superb job of tracing Turkey’s
complex, multilayered role. He performs an exhaustive analysis of the data and
the historical emergence of Turkey as an “energy corridor between the producer
countries in the east and consumer markets in the west” (p. 92). Replete with
pie charts, bar graphs, and tables illustrating the quantitative dimensions of direction of trade, composition of trade, caloric values, production and consumption, and so on, the volume will be the reference for some time to come for
scholars and policy makers interested in Turkey’s role in the hydrocarbon commodity chain.
Some of the pie charts are difªcult to read because of the lack of color il-
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lustration; grayscale can only do so much. Also, Biresselioglu refers to Turkey
with the feminine pronoun. A full exploration of the gender politics in this usage is beyond the scope of this review. Sufªce it to say, avoiding this usage is not
merely a matter of political correctness but of analytic precision and moving
away from anthropomorphizing a country. There are likely few analyses of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that refer to “her interests” or “her role” in international
affairs.
A deeper concern is that climate change ultimately has a subsidiary role in
the analysis. It is present at the outset in the series editor’s preface. In the early
chapters, too, climate change concerns are stirred in, especially in the effective
treatment of the European Union’s energy needs. Biresselioglu expertly analyzes
how the EU’s energy proªle has changed, with a growing (but nonetheless too
limited) emphasis on renewables as well as a reduction of emissions from fossil
fuels. Yet as the analysis narrows to focus on Turkey and its go-between role, climate concerns fade away. There is brief attention to renewables in Turkey and its
unique position in the Kyoto Protocol as the only OECD country with no emission targets. Biresselioglu notes that some of the promise of non-carbon energy
has been realized with wind, geothermal, and solar power, but that there is a
long way to go. But then the book becomes preoccupied with the geostrategic
dimensions of pipeline politics as they actually are, not as they could or should
be.
This focus is not surprising given the European economy’s reliance on
conventional hydrocarbons and the abundant supply in Asia. In this regard,
Biresselioglu’s book is indicative of the incompatibilities between energy security and climate security, especially when energy security is crafted in conventional terms. In the end, the book offers little indication that Europe’s pursuit of
energy security—and Turkey’s crucial role—might change in a way that does not
threaten climate security. One is left without much hope that Turkey’s transfer
role could be part of a more sustainable energy provision.
On this issue, the Anceschi and Symons volume is refreshing. As with any
edited volume, the selections are heterogeneous. Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change emerged from a conference at La Trobe University in Melbourne,
Australia. In part one, some of the chapters are primarily theoretical and not at
all preoccupied with a speciªc empirical case. For example, Maximilian Mayer
and Peer Schouten’s sharp, engaging ªrst chapter, “Energy Security and Climate
Security under Conditions of the Anthropocene,” interrogates the very foundations of security discourses. The authors view discourses not merely as social
constructs but as assemblages with very real, empirical manifestations. They examine how “externalities [are] silenced by energy security” (p. 22). In mainstream discourse by military and civilian policy makers, issues of corruption,
support for plutocratic regimes, the resource curse, the environmental impact of
extraction, the military as a massive polluter, the impact of consumption, and
the undermining of weak states are cast aside as inadvertent and, perhaps, correctable. From Mayer and Schouten’s perspective, however, the pursuit of energy
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security goes in tandem with disinformation by corporate interests, militaries,
and governments as part of a deeper agenda.
Another provocative chapter is Mark Diesendorf’s “Can Energy Security
and Effective Climate Change Policies Be Compatible?” It offers an appealing
technological optimism about the prospects of moving toward a system of energy efªciency, energy conservation, and renewables by 2050. Much damage
would be done in the four decades leading to that date. But the author makes a
persuasive case that sustainable technologies such as solar hot water and wind
could be fully implemented by 2020, far sooner than less appealing nuclear or
“clean fossil” (e.g., using carbon capture and storage) fuels.
In part two of the volume, seven chapters drill into empirical cases of speciªc locations: China, India, Japan, Russia, Indonesia, Central Asia, and Australia. Unfortunately, Diesendorf’s optimism and Mayer and Schouten’s sharp normative orientation seem to get left behind. While the chapters are thorough,
they tend to share Biresselioglu’s treatment of conventional energy security as a
dimension of national economic development. Tulsi Bisht’s chapter on India’s
Integrated Energy Policy and National Action Plan on Climate Change praises
the steps that policy makers have made, yet concludes that in the end India will
necessarily remain reliant on fossil fuels in its pursuit of economic development. Similarly, Akihiro Sawa’s chapter on Japan, completed just after the
Fukushima catastrophe of March 2011, is sober in its outlook. Japan has taken
important steps to decrease its reliance on fossil fuels and reduce its emissions.
Nonetheless, its massive energy demand is likely to contribute to climate
change. One way Japan is leading is in technological innovation and in transferring its energy technology to other countries. This development is a step in the
right direction but does not go far enough.
Taken together, these empirical case chapters are a treasure trove of analyses and data for scholars interested in respective accounts and stories. Yet, like
Biresselioglu’s book, they illustrate a fundamental problem: the tendency to use
nation-states as the unit of analysis. Alas, this approach is common in all kinds
of domains. Think of the ways analyses of the so-called Arab Spring dwell on individual national stories—Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen—even as the transnational nature of Mediterranean and Gulf security arrangements, the ªnancial
machinations in the region, the interconnectedness of oil markets, labor migration patterns, and rising commodity prices render country-by-country analyses
incomplete.
The four chapters in the ªnal section return to a more theoretical plane
and focus on transnational, multilateral, and meta-governmental forms of
cooperation. True, Peter Christoff’s “Energy Security and Climate Change—
Tensions and Synergies” remains preoccupied with states, although it is explicitly comparative. Jim Falk’s “Rethinking Energy Security in a Time of Transition”
takes on a more temporal and spatial preoccupation. It is a stimulating piece
that suggests the need to rethink “adaptation.” Adaptation, of course, sounds
pleasant and even peaceable. Yet, of course, it will likely be riddled with conºict.
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Falk is pessimistic, writing, “A species which continues to disrupt the stability
and sustainability of its environment is not likely to navigate an adaptive
course” (p. 252). Finally, coeditor Symons’ concluding chapter makes a fascinating and necessary call to transcend the national unit and move toward a
more effective, multilateral governance. Whether this transcendence can ever be
achieved is questionable, but the volume concludes with the strong case that
there is little choice.
Brown and Sovacool’s Climate Change and Global Energy Security, the carrot
of the three books, is the most engaging, largely because of its can-do optimism.
It is hardly naïve; it does not ignore the dirty water in the half-full glass. As Bill
Cosby is said to have quipped, the question is not whether the glass is half
full or half empty, but who’s pouring the water. Brown and Sovacool know full
well that the human thirst for hydrocarbons has poured polluted water into the
glass and that it is not going to get clean on its own. Thus, they are passionate
about solutions. Although the book is serious and weighty, it is quite accessible.
Whereas the ECES books are more suitable for scholars and policy makers,
Brown and Sovacool’s is also appropriate for the classroom.
Above all, Brown and Sovacool refuse to accept the construct of energy security as useful unless it incorporates climate security. They reject the conventional understanding on display in the ECES books. In introducing their sociotechnical approach, they deªne energy security as “the equitable provision of
available, affordable, reliable, efªcient, environmentally benign, properly governed, socially acceptable energy services to citizens” (p. 3). That is a tall order,
but the difference is palpable. They refuse to accept that a country or region is
achieving energy security worthy of the name if it is enmeshed in pipeline politics or if it is a developing country seeking to grow its economy.
To a certain extent, they are adopting the theoretical approach of Mayer
and Schouten’s chapter in Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change while also
exploring practical solutions for achieving reform. The book is successful in part
because it is not limited to one country, as Biresselioglu’s book is, or broken up
into discrete chapters, as is the Anceschi and Symons volume. The authors consider different economic sectors (electricity supply, transport, agriculture and
forestry, and waste and water) and the technological innovations that can
reduce emissions as well as facilitate adaptation. They also consider potential
technological innovation, geo-engineering solutions such as removing CO2 and
enhancing the albedo effect to cool the Earth. Throughout, they are cognizant of
political and economic challenges to reform. They advocate an approach that
takes into account multiple levels of engagement and myriad stakeholders.
The authors complete their analysis by examining eight cases from around
the world where actors have taken concrete steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The eight were drawn from seventy case studies that satisªed strict criteria.
Each case had to address real challenges with electricity, transport, deforestation, waste and water, and climate change; be holistic and polycentric; and be
successful and original. The authors’ treatment of the cases is complete and criti-
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cal. For example, Brazil’s Proálcool program and promotion of ºex-fuel vehicles
is presented as a net positive development, but the myriad challenges of biofuels are not underplayed. The extensive analyses of respective cases are models
that, again, make the book especially useful as a heuristic tool in the classroom.
Even as they, too, look at individual countries, Brown and Sovacool are challenging policy makers (and scholars) to stop thinking in terms of national security logics. Indeed, several of their cases are local/urban-level projects.
In recent decades, the concept of security has been vandalized, as traditional notions of national security—familiar from realist scholars in international relations—have been extended to include myriad other ostensible security concerns: human security, environmental security, food security, water
security, and, of course, energy security and climate security. Securitizing something heightens its importance. British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett linked
climate change to security in the run-up to the 2007 Security Council debate
on climate change, for exactly this reason.2 Nevertheless, the problem is that a
securitization gambit has a realist hangover; it suggests a friend–enemy distinction, an existential threat requiring exceptional measures, and a move outside of
politics. It is striking how policy makers (and scholars) remain mired in a national security logic when approaching energy security. In the end, securitizing
energy has prompted the current predicament with the environment.
How then might we desecuritize energy? What would it mean to move
away from a security discourse that empowers interests that beneªt from the
current assemblages of power? Can we envision a restructuring over the next
twenty to forty years, such that we will look back upon this decade as the beginning of reforms that liberated humans from dirty fossil fuels? At a minimum, if
we insist on thinking in terms of “energy security,” we have to change what we
mean by security. The good news is that there are strands in the current literature
that suggest we are at the dawn of a realization that domestic “energy security” is
meaningless unless it incorporates ecological imperatives for sustainability and
adaptation.

